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Production Cost, Transaction Cost, and Outsourcing Strategy: A Game Theoretic 
Analysis 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the impact of both production and 
transaction costs on the single-or-multiple source purchasing decision. Both dyadic 
interactions involving a buyer and a seller, and triadic interactions involving a buyer and two 
suppliers, are examined to gain a more precise understanding of how small number 
interactions might influence transaction cost.  We show that transaction cost is maximized 
when a buyer follows a single source strategy and learning specificity is present. Only if a 
buyer follows a multiple source strategy that splits the supply contract  in such a way as to 
equalize the effects of learning specificity across the suppliers, will transaction cost be 
maximized and will a buyer be able to appropriate the efficiency gains achieved by its 
suppliers. Production and transaction costs interact to influence governance decisions. The 
equilibrium is such that a single (multiple)  source strategy is optimal when efficiency gains 
due to the economies of scale are large (small), but those due to learning specificity are small 
(large). When both the effects of economies of scale and learning specificity are large, 
internalization is the optimal strategy. 
 
Key words:  Transaction Cost Economics, Game Theory, Small Numbers Interactions, 
Learning Specificity, Economies of Scale. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Purchasing managers often face the question of whether to purchase its materials from single 
or multiple suppliers. Research has shown that there are several advantages and 
disadvantages in following a single source strategy as compared to a multiple source strategy 
(e.g., Treleven, 1987; Segal, 1989; Presutti, 1992; Leavy 1994; Wilson, 1994). The common 
argument for a single source strategy is that it capitalizes on the economies of scale in bulk 
purchasing, and in the long run, a close exchange relationship develops, which is mutually 
beneficial to both buyers and suppliers. Hence, parties to an exchange relationship have been 
advised to forgo individual short-term gains, and to take a long-term perspective in following 
a single source strategy. However, such arguments implicitly assume that when parties are 
engaged in long-term dyadic exchange relationship, an equitable sharing of the efficiency 
gains would result. This ignores opportunistic behaviors by contracting parties and 
appropriable quasi rents which could arise in exchange relationships, especially when 
transaction specific assets are present (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978).  
Once a buyer is locked into an exchange relationship with a supplier, due to the 
presence of specific assets, the buyer is exposed to the hazards of opportunism in small 
numbers bargaining (Williamson, 1979). A multiple source strategy can be a means to 
safeguard against potential opportunistic behaviors by suppliers, and against delivery failures. 
However, should a buyer opt to source from multiple suppliers, the discount offered by the 
suppliers may not be as favorable. The superiority of a single source strategy over a multiple 
source strategy, or vice-versa, is therefore not as evident as it may seem (Leavy, 1994).  
In this paper, we present a game theoretic model of outsourcing strategy based on the 
arguments of Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1979 and 1981) (TCE). The 
objectives of this paper are to investigate how production and transaction costs impact a 
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buyer's decision to follow a single source or a multiple source strategy and to identify 
conditions when each of these strategies might be superior.  
The effect of transaction costs on governance decisions has been much researched 
into. However, the majority are empirical investigations (for a comprehensive review see 
Shelanski and Klein, 1995; and Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Our investigation follows a 
game theoretic approach in examining transaction cost so as to gain a more precise theoretical 
understanding of how dyadic interactions involving a buyer and a seller, and triadic 
interactions involving a buyer and two suppliers, might influence transaction cost. It is for the 
purpose of understanding opportunistic behaviors by parties in interactions that the use of 
game theory is most suitable (Moorthy, 1985). As Parkhe (1993) has also suggested, an 
integration of TCE and game theory could provide useful insights.  
In addition, out investigation of triadic interactions is also important because, 
although the emphasis of TCE is on small numbers interactions, research attention has 
focused mainly on dyadic exchange relationships. Hence, whether the arguments based on 
dyadic interactions are similarly valid for triadic exchange relationship is not clear. 
Less commonly researched into is our attempt to study the impact of both production 
and transaction costs on governance. As reported by Rindfleisch and Heide (1997, p47), 
“though TCA (transaction cost approach) recognizes that governance decisions involve a 
trade-off between transaction and production costs, few studies have examined the role of 
production costs”. In our model, a supplier chooses prices and his production cost is 
endogenous on the economies of scales and learning specificity, the latter being a form of 
human asset specificity that arises from learning-by-doing (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 
1979 and 1981; Shelanski and Klein, 1995). The buyer, on the other hand, chooses the 
outsourcing strategy that minimizes his cost of purchase. Both production cost and 
transaction cost concerns are therefore taken into consideration in our model. By doing so, 
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the role of production cost vis-à-vis transaction cost in determining appropriate governance 
structures can be clarified, as suggested by Rindfleisch and Heide (1997).  
Our study shows that transaction cost is maximized when a buyer follows a single 
source strategy and learning specificity is present. A single source supplier who is 
opportunistic can appropriate the efficiency gains from learning specificity, without passing 
any such gains to the buyer. In addition, because of learning specificity, the buyer will be 
locked into the exchange relationship with the single source supplier. This is true even if a 
buyer follows a multiple source strategy, but awards the supply contract in asymmetric 
proportions across the selected suppliers. Only if a buyer follows a multiple source strategy 
that splits the supply contract in such a way as to equalize the effects of learning specificity 
across the selected suppliers, will transaction cost be minimized. By doing so, the buyer will 
also be able to appropriate the efficiency gains, due to learning specificity, achieved by its 
suppliers. 
However, the splitting of the supply contract results in a reduction in efficiency gains 
derived from the economies of scale. Hence, while a single source strategy is optimal when 
efficiency gains due to the economies scale are large and those due to learning specificity are 
small, a multiple source strategy is dominant when transaction cost due to learning specificity 
is substantial and the economies of scale effect is small. A multiple source strategy can 
therefore be an effective alternative to internalization in safeguarding against opportunistic 
behaviors by suppliers, under the condition that the economies of scale and learning 
specificity effects are low and high respectively. However, when both the effects of the 
economies of scale and learning specificity are high, then internalization is the optimal 
strategy. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section contains the literature 
review. In the third section, the game theoretic model is developed. Following which, in the 
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fourth section, the transaction cost faced by a buyer is derived. The fifth section contains the 
analysis of single versus multiple source strategy, while the sixth section discusses the 
implication of the results derived and relates them to some empirical findings. The final 
section discusses the limitations of this paper and provides directions for future research. All 
proofs to the lemma and propositions presented in this paper are included in the Appendix. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The focus of transaction cost analysis is on the make-our-buy decision, which has been 
described as the paradigm problem of TCE (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). However, several 
studies have applied the transaction cost approach to examine other governance decisions. 
For example, Dwyer and Oh (1988) extrapolated TCE arguments to investigate three 
contractual channel systems (wholesale voluntary chains, dealer cooperatives, and 
independents). Dutta, Bergen, Heide and John (1995) applied TCE to examine how 
manufacturer lock-in (due to specific assets) and performance ambiguity might influence the 
use of single or dual distribution systems. Specifically, TCE argues that buyers should 
internalize their supply requirements to preempt against the hazards of opportunism in 
engaging external agents or suppliers, especially when transaction specific assets are involved 
in the exchange relationships. However, internalization is not the only means to safe guard 
against the opportunism of exchange partners. Several other alternatives have been proposed. 
For example, long term contracts were suggested as substitute for vertical integration 
(e.g., Kleindorfer and Knieps, 1982; and Joskow, 1987). Williamson (1983, 1984) proposed 
the use of hostages to credibly commit to exchange relationships. Heide and John (1990) 
examined the utility of relationships to safeguard relationship-specific investments and to 
facilitate adaptation to uncertainty. Stump and Heide (1996) suggested that the buyers could 
control supplier opportunism through partner qualification and selection, incentive design, 
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and monitoring. Anderson and Weitz (1992) proposed that pledges in the form of 
idiosyncratic investments could be effective in sustaining commitment in channel 
relationships, which suggests that opportunism could likewise be reduced. Klein et al.(1978) 
proposed that reputation & brand name could serve as collateral against opportunism. In 
particular, Klein and Leffler (1981) suggested that brand name is a form of specific asset that 
could serve as a collateral provided by suppliers to deliver high quality. Likewise, Farrel and 
Gallini (1988) proposed that second sourcing, or “invited” competition (Dutta and John, 
1995), can serve as a safeguard for a buyer's specific investments. While, Dutta et al. (1995, 
p194) suggested that “adding a direct sales force to augment the rep channel serves as a 
safeguard against lock-in problems with reps” and “provides a manufacturer with insight into 
downstream marketing activities” when performance is ambiguous. 
For small firms, which are often faced with resource limitations (Lee, Lim and Tan, 
1999; Lim, Lee and Tan, 2000) and for which the internalization option is not feasible, Heide 
and John (1988) proposed that they develop close bonds with their accounts to safeguard 
against opportunistic behaviors by their principals. A multiple source strategy has been 
proposed as a safeguard against delivery failures (Leavy, 1994; Wilson, 1994), and against 
suppliers' opportunism post contract award (Seshadri, Chatterjee and Lilien, 1991). With the 
presence of competing suppliers, those who act opportunistically would therefore face the 
threat of being replaced. 
According to TCE, transaction costs vary according to the characteristics of the 
transaction such as asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency associated with the exchange 
relationship (Williamson, 1985). In our model, the transaction cost is formally derived and is 
endogenous on learning specificity, that is, the extent of idiosyncratic knowledge that a 
supplier acquires over time. This ex-post cost therefore differs from the agency cost that 
arises from the private information that agents have of their own productivity or non-
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verifiability of agents' effort (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Olsen, 1996). A supplier 
acquires specific knowledge in production only if he is awarded a supply contract (in part or 
in full), and that the knowledge acquired is not salvageable outside of the specific buyer-
supplier(s) exchange relationship. The effect of frequency of transactions in terms of 
recurrence is represented in our model by way of a sequential game, in which the buyer's 
supply requirements are recurrent in each period; frequency in terms of size of transactions is 
captured in our model in the economy of scale and learning specificity effects. As the 
contracted volume of production increases, the unit cost of production decreases and the 
acquisition of specific knowledge of the production process increases. As with the basic 
tenets of TCE, the basic premise in this paper is that external agents are opportunistic in that 
they act in their self-interest and with guile. 
Although Williamson has stressed that “the object is to economize on the sum of 
production and transaction costs”, few studies have examined the combined effects of both 
transaction and production costs on governance decisions (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). An 
example is Anderson and Weitz's (1986) study of marketing productivity, which examined 
the trade-off between scale economies through the use of external agents, and the benefits of 
increased control and coordination achieved through vertical integration. Although a study by 
Noordeweir, John and Nevin (1990) focused on the impact of uncertainty on transaction cost, 
the authors also showed that cost performance improved when larger volumes were 
purchased, which suggests significant economies of scale effect and the importance of 
production cost on governance decisions. 
More related to our study is that of Walker and Weber's (1984), which examined the 
influence of transaction cost on the make-or-buy decision through the effects of supplier 
market competition, and volume and technological uncertainty. Although the focus of their 
study is on the impact of competition and uncertainty on transaction cost, the authors also 
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postulated that production cost advantage gained from a buyer's experience increases the 
likelihood of a buy decision (Walker and Weber, 1984). Their results showed that both 
transaction and production costs affect the make-or-buy decision, and that comparative 
production costs, between that of the supplier's and the buyer's, are strongest predictor of 
make-or-buy decisions, compared to volume uncertainty and supplier market competition. 
Walker and Weber (1987) replicated and extended their earlier study (Walker and Weber, 
1984) by examining the interaction effects of supply market competition and volume 
uncertainty. A related study by Lyons (1995) examined the interaction effect between the 
economies of scale and asset specificity on the make-or-buy decision, and found empirical 
support for such an effect. 
Compared to these studies that examined both transaction and production costs, this 
paper follows a game theoretic approach to examine how transaction costs arising from 
learning specificity, and production costs reduction that result from both learning specificity 
and economies of scale, affect governance decisions. In addition, the governance decision of 
concern in this paper is the single source versus the multiple source strategy, instead of the 
make-or-buy decision. The propositions derived in this paper provide a theoretical 
explanation of Lyon's (1995) empirical results and Walker and Weber's (1984) observations 
of the importance of comparative production cost in influencing governance decisions. 
Although Seshadri et al. (1991) have also followed a game theoretic approach in 
examining the issue of multiple source procurements, the authors focus on the effect of 
multiple sourcing on competitive behavior prior to supplier selection, in which the decision to 
source from multiple sources is exogenous. Similarly, a later paper by Seshadri (1995), which 
examined both the issues of selection and control of suppliers post contract award, also took 
the decision to multiple source as given. McAffee and Schwartz (1994) also examined the 
issue of multilateral vertical contracting. However, their focus is on the monopolist supplier 
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selling to competing downstream firms. In all these studies, the effects of production and 
transaction costs on governance were ignored. 
Williamson (1979) described asset specificity as the mot important dimension 
affecting transactions. Although there are various forms of asset specificity (e.g., Klein et al., 
1978; Williamson, 1981; Nooteboom, 1993a), we focus on learning specificity because it is 
the most commonly assessed form of specificity in TCE studies (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). It has also been reported that specialized technical know-how has a stronger influence 
than specialized physical capital on the decision to integrate production within a firm 
(Masten, Meethan and Snyder, 1989). Like Irwin and Klenow (1994), we define the 
“learning-by-doing” effect as an efficiency gain from cumulative production. This is in 
contrast to the economies of scale effect, which is endogenous on current production 
quantity. In addition, the learning effect that this paper is concerned with arises because of 
specific human capital in form of technical knowledge (Klein, 1988; Monteverde and Teece, 
1990), non-transferable, nor patentable (Monteverde and Teece, 1982). 
Several authors have also examined the effect of leaning specificity in their studies. 
For example, Monteverde and Teece (1982) examined how specialized non-patentable know-
how influence the make-or-buy decision, and showed that such know-how is positively 
related to the likelihood of vertically integrated production. However, the effect of the 
economies of scale on the make-or-buy decision was ignored. Pisano (1990) postulated that 
experience (or learning) impacts transaction cost and governance decisions, while 
Nooteboom (1993b) suggested that specific experience could be a barrier to change. There is 
also empirical evidence of learning specificity provided by Irwin and Klenow's (1994, p1200) 
study of learning-by-doing spillovers in the semiconductor industry, which showed that 
“firms learn three times more from an additional unit of their own cumulative production than 
from an additional unit of another's firm's cumulative production”. 
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MODEL 
Figure 1 illustrates the model in extensive form, which is a 4 stage sequential game played 
over 2 periods. Each period consists of 2 sequential stages. In stage one of Period 1, given the 
buyer's purchase requirements, a supplier decides on the price P1 per unit product to charge. 
We assume that the market is competitive in that there are multiple competing suppliers (m: 
m > 2). After assessing the suppliers' price quotes, in stage two, the buyer decides on whether 
to award the contract to a single supplier or to split the contract between two suppliers. The 
buyer may therefore award a portion of the contract α1, such that 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1, to one supplier 
and the remaining portion (1- α1) to another supplier. Thus, α1 ∈ (0, 1) means that the buyer 
chooses a single source strategy, while α1 such that 0 < α1 < 1, means that the buyer chooses 
a multiple source strategy, in Period 1.  
In Period 2, given the buyer's sourcing strategy in Period 1 and purchase requirements 
for Period 2, the buyer again calls for competitive bids from m suppliers. The incumbent 
supplier(s) responds by deciding on whether or not to continue supplying the buyer. If he 
decides to do so, he chooses the price level P2 (per unit product) in Period 2. Having observed 
the responses from the suppliers, the buyer then decides on the split of the contract by 
choosing α2: 0 ≤ α2 ≤ 1. The buyer may retain his incumbent supplier(s), or terminate the 
exchange relationship with his incumbent supplier(s). In the latter case, the buyer awards the 
contract to a new supplier(s) in Period 2.  
(Insert Figure 1 Here) 
With reference to Figure 1, πb(T) and πs(T) denote the buyer's and the supplier's 
payoffs respectively, when the incumbent supplier(s) chooses to stop supplying  in Period 2. 
The notations πb(I) and πs(I) refer to the payoffs to the buyer and supplier(s) respectively, 
when the buyer awards the contract to the incumbent supplier(s) in Period 2. Finally, πb(N) 
and πs(N) denote the payoffs to the buyer and the supplier(s) respectively, when the buyer 
 12 
awards the contract to a new supplier(s) in Period 2, thus replacing the incumbent supplier(s). 
As the purpose is to examine a buyer's optimal sourcing strategy, the sales and 
demand for the buyer's products, a long with the industry conditions, are taken to be 
exogenous. For simplicity, we assume a zero discount rate for payoffs in Period 2. Let the 
unit cost of production in Period i be ci .The profit pr unit of the product supplied, earned by 
the suppliers in Period i, is therefore (Pi - ci), i ∈{1, 2}. Let the total quantity of supplies 
required by the buyer be Q per period, which is exogenous. A supplier's payoffs for each 
period is therefore qi (Pi - ci), where qi is such that 0 ≤ qi ≤ Q and is dependent on the buyer's 
sourcing strategy as defined by α1. Hence, the total costs to the buyer and the total profits to 
each supplier are given by πb = Σi (PiQ) and πs = Σi (Pi -ci)qi , respectively. 
The buyer chooses the sourcing strategy α = {α1, α2} to minimize its cost of purchase. 
Hence, his objective function is as follows: 
Max. πb = Min.α Σi (PiQ) 
In contrast, a supplier chooses prices P = {P1, P2}, to maximize his payoffs. Hence, his 
objective function is as follows: 
Max. πs = Max.P  Σi (Pi -ci)qi 
The unit cost of production is endogenous on the production quantity qi  and the 
cumulative production quantity to Period i, zy  = Σi qi , that is  ci  = (qi , zy ), where zy is such 
that 0 ≤ zy  ≤ 2Q, for the two-period game. To incorporate the effects of economy of scale and 
learning specificity, I assume that the function c (qi , zy )is strictly decreasing and convex with 
respect to qi  and  zy   that is  00,0,0 2
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. The learning effect is 
transaction specific in that a supplier learns, or acquires specific knowledge in production, 
only if it is awarded the supply contract in part or in full, and that the knowledge acquired is 
not salvageable outside of the specific buyer-supplier(s) exchange relationship. We assume 
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that the learning rate is exogenous and symmetric across suppliers. With the exception that 
suppliers may acquire specific knowledge asymmetrically, they are also assumed to be 
identical in terms of their production technology. 
 
TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS 
Following the subgame perfection criteria, the incumbent suppliers' responses in Period 2 are 
first examined, given that the buyer outsources his requirement and splits the contract into 
two portions comprising αiQ and (1- α1 )Q in Period 1. For an incumbent supplier who has 
been awarded a contract  αiQ in Period 1 and α2Q in Period 2, his unit cost of production is 
given by c(q2, z2) = c(α2Q, α1Q), as a result of his acquisition of specific knowledge in Period 
1. 
In contrast, for suppliers who were not awarded a supply contract in Period 1, they 
would not be c(α2Q, 0) if they were awarded a contract  α2Q in Period 2. Since c(α2Q, α1Q) 
< c(α2Q, 0), ∀ α1 : 0 < α1  ≤  1, incumbent suppliers would therefore have a cost advantage 
over their competitors as a result of learning specificity. In addition, since c(α2Q, α1Q) < 
c(α2Q,(1-α1 )Q), ∀ α1 : 0.5 < α1 ≤  1, the incumbent supplier who is awarded a large portion 
of the contract in Period 1 will have a cost advantage over the other incumbent supplier who 
is awarded a smaller portion of the contract. This implies that, in Period 2, the incumbent 
supplier who is awarded a larger portion of the contract could offer a price that just undercuts 
the other incumbent's unit cost by a small amount ε, such that ε → 0, to secure the whole 
contract. Hence, Lemma 1 follows. 
Lemma 1: P2 = P** = Max. {c(q,  α1Q), c(q, (1-α1 )Q)}, ∀α1 : 0 ≤ α1  ≤  1. 
Let cmin = Min. {c(q,  α1Q),c(q, (1-α1 )Q)}, be the unit cost of the incumbent supplier 
with the lowest cost. Lemma 1 implies that the incumbent supplier with the cost advantage 
will charge a price that just undercuts the cost of the supplier with the next lowest unit cost, 
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in Period 2. By doing so, he maximizes the appropriation of the efficiency gains derived from 
learning specificity, amounting to (P** - cmin) = ⁄ c(q,  α1Q) -c(q, (1-α1 )Q) ⁄ , which is 
greater than or equal to 0. The margin (P** - cmin)represents the transaction cost faced by the 
buyer in outsourcing his supply requirements, and is dependent on learning specificity and 
the buyer's outsourcing strategy as defined by α = {α1, α2}. 
 Proposition 1: By outsourcing and splitting the supply contract {α1, α2} in Period 1, a 
buyer faces a transaction cost, (P** - cmin) = ⁄ c(q,  αiQ) -c(q, (1-α1 )Q) 
⁄, in Period 2.  
Proposition1 implies that transaction cost will be maximized when α1 ε (0, 1), that is, when 
the buyer follows a single source strategy, in which case (P** - cmin) ⁄ c(q, 0) -  c(q, Q) ⁄. An 
incumbent supplier who is opportunistic can appropriate all the efficiency gains derived from 
learning specificity, without passing any such gains to the buyer in Period 2, if he is awarded 
the full contract in Period 1. Given that P** = Max. {c(q,  α1Q), c(q, (1-α1 )Q)}, the subgame 
equilibrium in Period 2 is such hat the buyer chooses  α2 = 1 if α1 ≠ 0.5, and chooses α2 = 0.5 
if  αi = 0.5, in which case P** = c(q,  α1Q) = c(q, (1-α1 )Q)}. This result is stated in Lemma 
2. 
Lemma 2:  The subgame equilibrium in Period 2 is such that the buyer chooses α2 
= 1, if α1 ≠ 0.5, which results in P** = Max. {c(q,  α1Q), c(q, (1-
α1)Q)}, and chooses 0 ≤  α2  ≤  1 if  α1 = 0.5, which results in P** = 
c(q,  α1Q) = c(q, (1-α1 )Q). 
Lemma 2 implies that the transaction cost faced by the buyer can be minimized if the 
buyer follows a multiple source strategy and splits the contract symmetrically in Period 1. y 
doing so, (P** - cmin) = {c(q,  α1Q), c(q, (1-α1 )Q)} = 0, since c(q,  α1Q) = c(q, (1-α1 )Q), 
and in Period 2, the buyer will be able to appropriate the efficiency gains derived from 
learning specificity, achieved by its incumbent suppliers. Since P** = c(q,  α1Q)   c(q, (1-α1 
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)Q), in anticipation that the buyer will optimally choose  α1  = (1-α1 )(Lemma 2), a supplier's 
best response in Period 1 is to charge a competitive price P1 = P* = c(q, 0). 
Proposition 2: By splitting the contract symmetrically across the suppliers, 
choosing αi =  (1-αi ) in period i = 1, 2, the buyer minimizes the 
transaction cost he faces and appropriates the cost savings achieved by 
his incumbent suppliers that results from learning specificity. 
Propositions 1 and 2 are therefore consistent with Dutta and John's (1995) observation 
that a monopolist supplier would “exploit the locked-in buyers unless checked by the 
presence of the second firm”. Having determined the optimal reasons in each stage of the 
game, we shall now examine how transaction and production costs might influence the 
equilibrium outsourcing strategy. 
 
SINGLE VERSUS MULTIPLE SOURCE STRATEGY 
In the absence of the effect of learning specificity, Lemma 1 implies that P** = P* = c(q,0) 
per unit, because of competition among suppliers. Since c(q,0) decreases with quantity 
purchased, a buyer can minimize his cost of purchase by awarding the whole contract, α1  = 
1, to a single supplier in any Period i, i ≥ 1. Hence, in the absence of asset specificity, 
economies of scale considerations favor a single source strategy. 
Proposition 3: In the absence of learning specificity effect, a single source strategy 
minimizes a buyer's cost of purchase, P** = P* = c(q,0). 
However, when asset specificity is present and the buyer follows a single source 
strategy in Period 1 (α1 = 1), Lemma 2 implies that P** = P* = c(q,0) and α2  =1. Extending 
the argument to n periods, if α1 ≠ 0.5, then αi+1 = 1, ∀  i ≥ 1. This means if the buyer follows 
a single source strategy in Period 1, then he will be locked into the exchange relationship 
with the incumbent supplier as a result of learning specificity. What is more, the transaction 
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cost faced by the buyer, (P** - cmin) = ⁄ c(q,0) – c(q,Q) ⁄ , is maximized (Proposition 1), under 
a single source strategy, as the incumbent supplier appropriates all costs savings from 
learning specificity without passing any such savings to the buyer. Given that P** = P* = 
c(q,0), the total cost of purchase to the buyer over the two periods is therefore πb (I) = 
2Q[c(Q,0)], under the single source strategy. Proposition 4 thus follows. 
Proposition 4: If the buyer follows a single source strategy in Period 1, α1 = 1,  
(i) He will be locked into the exchange relationship with the incumbent supplier 
in all future periods, αi+1 = 1, ∀  i ≥ 1. 
(ii) Transaction cost is maximized, (P** - cmin) = ⁄ c(q,0) – c(q,Q) ⁄ , and πb (I) = 
2Q[c(Q,0)]. 
A single source strategy is optimal in the absence of asset specificity (Proposition 3). 
However, as Proposition 4 shows, when specific assets are present, a buyer following a single 
source strategy will be locked into the dyadic exchange relationship and transaction cost will 
also be maximized. Proposition q4 therefore confirms the central concern of TCE that, in 
dyadic exchange relationships, transaction specific assets gives rise to quasi-rents and hazards 
of opportunism (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979 and 1981). 
Given that, the buyer and his single source supplier are locked into the exchange 
relationship, when specific assets are present, the dyadic exchange relationship is sustainable. 
However, the lop-sided sharing of the gains from learning specificity, with the supplier 
appropriating virtually all such gains, could result in conflicts in the exchange relationship. 
This is therefore consistent with Sriram and Mummalaneni's (1990) observation that 
economic gains can be so substantial that exchange relationship can be sustained, even 
though conflicts exist in the relationship.  
When the buyer follows a multiple source strategy in Period 1 and splits the contract 
asymmetrically across the suppliers, he will be locked into the exchange relationship with the 
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incumbent supplier who is awarded a larger portion of the contract in Period 1, as Lemma 2 
implies. A multiple source strategy in which the buyer splits the contract asymmetrically 
across the suppliers is therefore not sustainable over the long run. However, a multiple source 
strategy of splitting the contract symmetrically across the suppliers in Period 1 is sustainable, 
as Lemma 2 implies also, and minimizes the transaction cost faced by the buyer (Proposition 
2). Under such a strategy, P* = c(½ Q, 0), P** = c(½Q, ½Q) (Lemma 2), and hence, the 
buyer's cost of purchase πb (I) is equal to Q[c(½Q,0)+ c(½Q, ½Q)] over Periods 1 and 2, 
while the suppliers' payoffs πs(I) = 0. 
Proposition 5: 
(i) Under a multiple source strategy, if the contract is split asymmetrically across 
the suppliers in Period 1,  α1 ≠ 0.5, then the incumbent supplier who is 
awarded the larger contract will be able to secure the whole contract in all 
future periods, αi+1 = 1, ∀  i ≥ 1. 
(ii) A multiple source strategy is sustainable over the long run if and only if the 
contracts split symmetrically across the suppliers in all periods i,  αi  = 0.5, 
∀ i = 1, ... n, in which case πb (I) = Q[c(½Q,0) - c(½Q, ½Q)] and πs(I) = 0. 
It has been suggested that the introduction of competition among selected suppliers 
would provide for post-award cost control, only if multiple suppliers are chosen in the initial 
process (Seshadri, et al.,1991). Proposition 5 refine this condition for post-award cost control. 
Not only must multiple suppliers be chosen initially, the effect of learning specificity must 
also be equalized across the selected suppliers. This can be achieved through a symmetric 
split of the supply contract across the selected suppliers. 
Although, a multiple source strategy of splitting the contract symmetrically between 
the suppliers minimize the transaction cost, the buyer's cost of purchase may not be 
minimized. This is because the efficiency gains from the economies of scale are reduced, as 
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the production volume for each supplier becomes smaller. There is a tradeoff in production 
cost due to greater economies of scale by following a single source strategy, against 
transaction cost reduction by following a multiple source strategy. The use of a multiple 
source strategy to insure against hazard of opportunism in the outsourcing of supplies 
therefore carries a cost in reduced economies of scale. Proposition 6 states the equilibrium 
outsourcing strategy. 
Proposition 6: A multiple source strategy of splitting the supply contract 
symmetrically across the suppliers minimizes the buyer's cost of 
purchase only if the condition that [c(½Q,0)+ c(½Q, ½Q)] < 2c(Q, 
0) is satisfied. 
Proposition 6 implies that a multiple source strategy is the dominant one in the long 
run, when transactions are recurring and efficiency gains due to specific knowledge are 
substantial. Under such situations, a multiple source strategy allows the buyer to appropriate 
the efficiency gains that result from learning specificity achieved by its suppliers, and also 
makes each of the suppliers more replaceable. As Heide and John (1988, p25) have 
suggested, “firms with high levels of specific assets can improve their performance by 
improving the replace ability of their exchange partners”.  
However, Proposition 6 seriously questions the suggestion that a long-term 
perspective favors a single source strategy, as this ignores the appropriation risks when 
transaction specific assets are present (Klein, 1978; Williamson, 1979). As Williamson 
(1979, p242) has also highlighted, in a bilateral monopoly, “Although both (buyer and seller) 
have a long term interest in effecting adaptations of a joint profit maximizing kind, each also 
has an interest in appropriating as much of the gains as he can on each occasion to adapt”. 
Proposition 6 also clarifies the role of production cost vis-à-vis transaction cost in 
governance decision (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). In particular, Proposition 6 implies that, 
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if production is highly idiosyncratic in that the efficiency gains due to learning specificity is 
substantial, then over the long run, a multiple source strategy clearly dominates a single 
source strategy in terms of purchase cost minimization for the buyer. Conversely, a single 
source strategy is optimal when the effect of learning specificity is small, but the effect of 
economies of scale is large. However, when both the effects of the economies of scale and 
learning specificity are substantial, then internalization would be the optimal strategy. An 
internalization strategy maximizes on the benefits of both these effects, instead of having to 
trade-off the benefits of economies of scale vis- à-vis learning specificity when following a 
single source or a multiple source strategy. Hence, Williamson's (1985) suggestion that, 
production is more likely to be brought in-house to take advantage of the economies of scale 
if transactions are frequent, is conditional on high asset specificity characterizing the 
transactions. The corollary thus follows. 
Corollary: An internalization strategy is optimal when both the effects of economies 
of scale and learning specificity are large. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The explicit consideration of the impact of both production and transaction costs on 
outsourcing strategy through a game theoretic analysis yields some novel insights. A single 
source strategy has the advantage of maximizing efficiency gains due to the economies of 
scale. However, as Table 1 shows, under a single source strategy, transaction cost is 
maximized and is higher than that under a multiple source strategy (Proposition 1). In 
addition, the efficiency gains that result from learning specificity are appropriate by the 
supplier, and the buyer will be locked into the exchange relationship with his sole supplier 
(Proposition 4). This occurs even if the supply market is competitive because the market is 
transformed from one large numbers interactions into one of dyadic interactions or bilateral 
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monopoly on account of transaction specific assets (Williamson, 1979). Only by following a 
multiple source strategy of splitting the contract symmetrically across the selected suppliers 
will a buyer be able to appropriate the efficiency gains that are derived from learning 
specificity (Proposition 2). Such a strategy minimizes the transaction cost (Table 1) and is 
also sustainable over the long run (Proposition 5(ii)). However, a multiple source strategy of 
splitting the contract asymmetric across the selected suppliers is not sustainable in the long 
run (Proposition 5(i)). 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Table 2 illustrates the impact of the effects of the economies of scale and learning 
specificity on governance decisions. As Table 2 shows, while economies of scale 
considerations favor a single source strategy (Proposition 3), learning specificity 
considerations favor a multiple source strategy (proposition 6). Hence, when both the effects 
of economies of scale and learning specificity are large, then internalization is the optimal 
strategy. Obviously, as Proposition 3 implies also, when both the effects of the economies of 
scale and learning specificity are low, then a single source strategy is optimal. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
There are several implications to the theoretical propositions presented in this paper 
for empirical research on the impact of transaction cost on governance decision. It is 
important that the empirical studies take into explicit account both production and transaction 
costs in examining governance decisions. As Table 2 shows, under the low asset specificity 
condition, a single source strategy is optimal, as production cost considerations overwhelms 
transaction cost considerations in governance decisions. As Lyons (1995, p442) has also 
observed, “Economies of scale and scope are a significant motivation behind the decision to 
buy-in, but only in the absence of specific assets. Specific assets are the overriding influence 
when scale or scope economies exist”. This also explains Walker and Weber's (1984) result 
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which shows that comparative production costs are the strongest predictor of make-buy 
decisions for components. For such products, the effect of learning specificity would be low, 
but that of the economies of scale would be high, therefore suggesting a buy (single source 
strategy) decision. Walker and Weber (1984) also reported that the effect of supplier market 
competition on the make-or-buy decision is low, but significant. This could also be attributed 
to the low learning specificity effect of the product chosen for investigation. 
When conducting empirical research, it is also equally important to clearly distinguish 
between the single and multiple source strategies under the buy decision. This is because, as 
Proposition 3 and 6 imply, there is an interaction effect between economies of scale and asset 
specificity condition, in which case the equilibrium governance decision is to outsource by 
following a multiple source strategy if the effect of the economies of scale is small. 
Otherwise, internalization is the optimal strategy. The neglect of production cost 
considerations in governance decisions, when conducting empirical investigations, could 
therefore lead to potentially misleading conclusions. 
Walker and Weber (1987) suggested that “Even when a buyer owns specialized assets 
and has low costs of switching suppliers, transaction costs can arise when the supplier is not 
constrained from behaving opportunistically by the presence of other firms competing for a 
buyer's business”. In comparison, our analysis shows that, even when neither buyers nor 
suppliers have invested in any specific assets ex-ante, transaction cost can arise when 
suppliers acquire specific experience or learning ex-post and are not constrained from 
behaving opportunistically by competing suppliers who possess similar idiosyncratic 
knowledge. Hence, supply market competition by itself is not enough to safeguard against the 
hazards of opportunism, homogeneity of the suppliers' production capabilities post contract 
award is crucial for minimizing  appropriable quasi rents. Finally, our analysis also confirms 
Monteverde and Teece's (1982) intuition that, “Even if the title to specialized equipment used 
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by the supplier is held by the assembler, this need not provide protection against rent 
appropriation if transaction-specific know-how has been generated”. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While this paper has provided a more precise understanding of the role of production cost in 
governance decisions under dyadic and triadic interactions, there are several limitations that 
are worth nothing. We have not included environmental uncertainty in our analysis at this 
stage (e.g. Walker and Weber, 1984 and 1987, Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; Weiss and 
Anderson, 1992; Stump and Heide, 1996) as its inclusion will make the analysis less 
tractable. We have also not considered how product quality might influence governance 
decisions. Product quality improves with an increase in the acquisition of specific knowledge, 
which potentially increases the risk of opportunism in outsourcing. We have also not 
considered reputation effects, which may deter players from opportunistic behaviors (Klein 
and Leffler, 1981). An important assumption in our model is that the suppliers possess the 
same technology and learn at the same rate. However, if this is not true then the results may 
not hold. However, given that collusion is illegal in many countries, this seems to be a 
reasonable assumption. 
The model presented can be extended in several ways. Of the many types of asset 
specificity identified (e.g., Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1981; Nooteboom, 1993a), we 
have focused only on one type of asset specificity, that is, human asset specificity. Future 
studies could investigate the impact of the various types of specific asset on governance 
decisions. Another logical extension would be to conduct an empirical verification of the 
theoretical propositions derived in this study. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1:  
In Period 2, the unit cost of production are c(q, α1Q) and c(q, (1-α1)Q) for the suppliers 
awarded the contract α1  and (1-α1) respectively, ∀  α1 : 0 ≤   α1   ≤  1. Hence, if c(q, α1Q) 
<c(q, (1-α1)Q), then P2  = P**  = [c(q, (1-α1)Q) – ε] = c(q, (1-α1)Q), as ε → 0. Similarly, if 
c(q, α1Q) > c(q, (1-α1)Q), then P2  = P**  = c(q, α1Q). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
From Lemma 1, P2 = P** = Max. {c(q, α1 Q), c(q, (1-α1)Q)}, while the unit cost of 
production for the supplier with the lowest cost is Min. {c(q, α1 Q), c(q, (1-α1)Q)}. Hence, 
(P** - cmin) = ⁄ c(q,  α1Q) -c(q, (1-α1 )Q) ⁄. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
If α1 ≠ 0.5, then c(q, α1Q) ≠  c(q, (1-α1)Q), and P**  = Max. {c(q, αi Q), c(q, (1-α1)Q)}  
from Lemma 1. The incumbent supplier with the cost advantage can charge a price that just 
undercuts that of the other incumbent supplier by an amount ε → 0 to secure the whole 
contract, α2   = 1, in Period 2. However, if α1 = 0.5, then c(q, α1 Q), and  P**  = c(q, α1 Q) 
= c(q, (1-α1)Q). The buyer is therefore indifferent in choosing α2 in Period 2. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
From Lemma 2, if  α1  = (1-α1), P**  = c(q, α1Q) = c(q, (1-α1)Q), which implies that ∀  i, i 
= 1, ... n periods, if α1  = (1-α1), then P i-1  = c(q, α1Q) c(q, (1-α1)Q), and (P i+1 – cmin) = 0. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
In the absence of specific knowledge effects, Lemma 1 implies P** = c(q,0) = P*. Since 
c(q,0) is decreasing in q, the buyer's is thus minimized by maximizing q, choosing q = Q. 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 4:    
Lemma 2 implies that, P** = P* = c(q,0) and α2 = 1, given that  α1 = 1. Hence, if α1 ≠ 0.5, 
then αi+1 = 1.  ∀i ≥ 1, and as Proposition 1 implies, (P i-1 – cmin) =  ⁄ c(q,0) – c(q,Q) ⁄  is 
maximized and  πb (I) = 2Q[c(Q,0)]. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5:  
(i) Lemma 2 implies that, if the buyer splits the contract asymmetrically, α1 ≠ ½, then   
αi+1 = 1.  ∀i ≥ 1 (proof to Proposition 4). 
(ii) If the buyer splits the contract symmetrically, α1 = (1-α1) = ½, then from Proposition 
2, P i+1 = c(q, ½ Q), and (P i+1 – cmin) = 0. Since P* = c( ½ Q, 0) and  P**  = c(½Q, 
½Q)( Lemma 2), the buyer's cost of purchase πb (I) = Q[c( ½ Q, 0) - c(½Q, ½Q)] over 
Periods 1 and 2, while the supplier's payoffs are given by πs(I) = 0.  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6:  
If the buyer follows a single source strategy, πb (I) = 2Q[c(Q,0)] (Proposition 4).  If the 
buyer follows a multiple source strategy, splitting the contract symmetrically, πb (I) = Q[c( ½ 
Q, 0) - c(½Q, ½Q)] (Proposition 5(ii)). Hence, a multiple source strategy is superior if Q[c( 
½ Q, 0) - c(½Q, ½Q)] < 2Q[c(Q,0)] ⇒[c(( ½ Q, 0) - c(½Q, ½Q)] < 2c(Q,0). Q.E.D 
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Table 1: 
Transaction Costs and Payoffs under Single and Multiple Source Strategies 
Sourcing 
 Strategy 
Transaction Cost 
(P**-c) 
Buyer's  
Cost of Purchase 
πb (I) 
Supplier's 
Profits 
πs(I) 
Single Source [c(Q,0) -c(Q,Q)] 2Q[c(Q,0)] Q[c(Q,0) -c(Q,Q)] 
Multiple Source 0 Q[c(½Q, 0) – c(½Q,½Q) 0 
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Table 2:  
Impact of Economy of Scale and Learning Specificity  
on Equilibrium Governance Decision 
 Economy of Scale Effect 
 
 Low High 
Low Single Source Strategy 
High Multiple Source 
Strategy 
Internalization 
Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Learning 
Specificity 
Effect 
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Figure 1: 
Game Theoretic Model of Sourcing Strategy 
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